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Search results “X frame options header sameorigin”
Introduction to Frame-busting, X-Frame-Options HTTP Header and Click-Jacking
 
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Author: Jeremy Druin Twitter: @webpwnized Thank you for watching. Please support this channel. Up vote, subscribe or even donate by clicking "Support" at https://www.youtube.com/user/webpwnized! Description: Using Mutillidae, we contrast JavaScript frame busting code and the X-FRAME-OPTIONS header. The two methods are compared on a site being framed. The site is framed inside of an iframe tag and the two methods prevent the site from appearing in the iframe. These two methods are useful in helping with cross site framing and click-jacking. Mutillidae is a free web application with vulnerabilities added on purpose to give security enthusiast and developers an application to practice various attacks and defenses. It is a free download on Sourceforge. Updates on Mutillidae are tweeted at @webpwnized.
Views: 19687 webpwnized
Protect Your Website from Clickjacking attack using .htacess
 
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Learn how to Protect Your Website from Clickjacking attack using .htacess . enable X-Frame-Options in your site HTTP response headers . website to test clickjacking - https://tools.geekflare.com/tools/x-frame-options-test. Angle brackets IfModule mod_headers.c Angle brackets Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN Angle brackets /IfModule Angle brackets ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- High Performance Hosting must try fastcomet- https://www.gomahamaya.com/go/fastcomet-blackfriday 14 days free trail cloud hosting - https://www.gomahamaya.com/go/fastcomet-free-trail Bluehost- https://www.gomahamaya.com/go/bluehost inmotion hosting - https://www.gomahamaya.com/go/inmotion-hosting ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Donate to support our work- https://www.paypal.me/gomahamaya paypal email id - [email protected] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Get in touch with us on Social Media. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/gomahamaya Twitter: https://twitter.com/gomahamaya -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- contact us on our website- https://www.gomahamaya.com/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Views: 1038 Gomahamaya
Prevent Click Jaking Attack of your Apache web server
 
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To remove Click jacking attack There are three settings for X-Frame-Options: 1. SAMEORIGIN: This setting will allow page to be displayed in frame on the same origin as the page itself. 2. DENY: This setting will prevent a page displaying in a frame or iframe. 3. ALLOW-FROM uri: This setting will allow page to be displayed only on the specified origin. Implement in Apache, IBM HTTP Server Add following line in Apache Web Server’s httpd.conf file Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN OR Implement in shared web hosting If your website is hosted on shared web hosting then you won’t have permission to modify httpd.conf. However, you can implement this by adding following line in .htaccess file. Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN Now you may check using https://tools.geekflare.com/web-tools/x-frame-options-test Success.
Views: 1695 Web illusion
Missing X-Frame-Options Header POC Not Fix
 
02:00
Educational Purpose Only
X frame options
 
00:54
Views: 726 Abe Nunez
X-Frame-Options Bypass at PHDays.com Website
 
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A new, previously unknown cross-site scripting vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer, which lets remote users bypass the same-origin policy and inject arbitrary JavaScript into HTML pages, was revealed this week.
Views: 4467 Positive Technologies
Khamsat X-frame-Options Bug #Wikipwn #Hijacking
 
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CSRF Token in iframe
Views: 1035 Mostafa Kasem
Server einrichten - X-Frame-Options bei nginx gegen Clickjacking
 
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In diesem Tutorial schauen wir uns X-Frame-Options an, die gegen Clickjacking helfen können. ACHTUNG: HK-HOSTING EXISTIERT NICHT MEHR! Die Techniken ab Video 5 sind allerdings immer noch genauso gültig wie immer. Bei Fragen einfach schreiben. ❤❤❤ Früherer Zugang zu Tutorials, Abstimmungen, Live-Events und Downloads ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ https://www.patreon.com/user?u=5322110 ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ Keinen Bock auf Patreon? ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ https://www.paypal.me/TheMorpheus ❤❤❤ 🌍 Website 🌍 https://the-morpheus.de ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ Tritt der Community bei ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ ** https://discord.gg/BnYZ8XS ** ** https://www.reddit.com/r/TheMorpheusTuts/ ** ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°) Mehr News? Mehr Code? ℱ https://www.facebook.com/themorpheustutorials 🐦 https://twitter.com/TheMorpheusTuts 🐙 https://github.com/TheMorpheus407/Tutorials Du bestellst bei Amazon? Bestell über mich, kostet dich null und du hilfst mir »-(¯`·.·´¯)-» http://amzn.to/2slBSgH Videowünsche? 🎁 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YPv8fFJOMRyyhUggK8phrx01OoYXZEovwDLdU4D4nkk/edit#gid=0 Fragen? Feedback? Schreib mir! ✉ https://www.patreon.com/user?u=5322110 ✉ https://www.facebook.com/themorpheustutorials ✉ https://discord.gg/BnYZ8XS ✉ [email protected] oder schreib einfach ein Kommentar :)
Same Origin Method Execution (SOME) - Exploiting a Callback for Same Origin Policy Bypass
 
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By Ben Hayak SOME - "Same Origin Method Execution" is a new technique that abuses JSONP in order to perform a limitless number of unintended actions on a website on behalf of users, by assembling a malicious set of timed frames and/or windows. Despite the similarity to click-jacking, this attack is not UI related nor it is confined in terms of user interaction, browser brand, HTTP X-FRAME-OPTIONS/Other response headers or a particular webpage, in fact, when a webpage found vulnerable to "SOME", the entire domain becomes vulnerable. During this talk, I intend to demonstrate how JSONP opens a backdoor, even in the most protected domains, to a very powerful attack that can cause severe damage without any user-interaction.
Views: 4895 Black Hat
Fix Clickjacking
 
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This video will show you that how to fix clickjacking vulnerability in you website.
Views: 2280 Maheshkumar Darji
Exploiting clickjack vulnerability to steal cookies of user | Google Talkgadet Vulnerability
 
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I know i slipped some words :) Twitter: https://twitter.com/singh_jasminder Blog: http://jasminderpalsingh.info/
Views: 3177 Jasminder Pal Singh
Bypass cross origin policies using an image.
 
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Github project: https://github.com/smiegles/crossdomain Follow us on Twitter! https://www.twitter.com/zerocopter
Views: 1201 Zerocopter
OWASP DevSlop E02 - Security Headers!
 
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Franziska Bühler and Tanya Janca add security headers to their website, DevSlop.co and continue their DevSecOps learning journey. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_DevSlop_Project Security Headers Used: x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin Websites Shown: https://securityheaders.com/ https://www.hardenize.com/
Views: 300 OWASP DevSlop
Facebook SDK Logout Javascript FB.logout X-Frame-Options [Solution]
 
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Logout using Facebook SDK for Javascript FB.logout [Solution] This is the solution to logout correctly using Facebook SDK for Javascript (FB.logout()) when appear this error: Refused to display 'https://www.facebook.com/home.php' in a frame because it set 'X-Frame-Options' to 'DENY'.
Sandbox Attribute Of Iframe Tag In HTML with all values explained | allow-same-origin | allow....
 
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Hi guys... In this tutorial i have discussed the sandbox attribute of Iframe tag in detail. I have tried to explain each value of sandbox attribute in detail that is allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-top-navigation allow-scripts allow-forms Hope you like it... Enjoy.... Like us on facebook at : https://www.facebook.com/Lets-Create-With-HTML-And-CSS-1264488093673620/ Follow us on Google+ at : https://plus.google.com/u/0/b/108110722760465393248/108110722760465393248
HTTP Security Header (GPN17)
 
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https://media.ccc.de/v/gpn17-8599-http_security_header Edition 2017 - Latest & Greatest Überblick über HTTP Security Header - welche gibt es, welche sind sinnvoll, wie benutzt man sie, worauf sollte man achten! Ives Laaf
Views: 909 media.ccc.de
MIME sniffing (Explained by Example)
 
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Any content served through HTTP “should” include meta data about its type. This is so the browser/client knows what to do with the content it receives. For example, if the content type header is an image the browser will preview it, if it is HTML it will render the markup and execute any javascript code. Content type however is optional and web masters sometimes don’t set it, which leave the browsers wondering about the content type it is consuming. So browsers had to implement parsing and “sniffing” techniques to detect the type of content when a content type header was not served. However, this caused security problems and attacks that we explain in this video! So to prevent sniffing, web servers can return X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff which opts out browsers from sniffing the content. Media type: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_type#Common_examples Cheers! Hussein Nasser
Views: 325 IGeometry
Server einrichten - X-Content-Type-Options bei nginx
 
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In diesem Tutorial schauen wir uns den header zu X-Content-Type Options an. ACHTUNG: HK-HOSTING EXISTIERT NICHT MEHR! Die Techniken ab Video 5 sind allerdings immer noch genauso gültig wie immer. Bei Fragen einfach schreiben. ❤❤❤ Früherer Zugang zu Tutorials, Abstimmungen, Live-Events und Downloads ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ https://www.patreon.com/user?u=5322110 ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ Keinen Bock auf Patreon? ❤❤❤ ❤❤❤ https://www.paypal.me/TheMorpheus ❤❤❤ 🌍 Website 🌍 https://the-morpheus.de ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ Tritt der Community bei ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ ** https://discord.gg/BnYZ8XS ** ** https://www.reddit.com/r/TheMorpheusTuts/ ** ( ͡° ͜ʖ ͡°) Mehr News? Mehr Code? ℱ https://www.facebook.com/themorpheustutorials 🐦 https://twitter.com/TheMorpheusTuts 🐙 https://github.com/TheMorpheus407/Tutorials Du bestellst bei Amazon? Bestell über mich, kostet dich null und du hilfst mir »-(¯`·.·´¯)-» http://amzn.to/2slBSgH Videowünsche? 🎁 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YPv8fFJOMRyyhUggK8phrx01OoYXZEovwDLdU4D4nkk/edit#gid=0 Fragen? Feedback? Schreib mir! ✉ https://www.patreon.com/user?u=5322110 ✉ https://www.facebook.com/themorpheustutorials ✉ https://discord.gg/BnYZ8XS ✉ [email protected] oder schreib einfach ein Kommentar :)
Solving "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" in localhost NodeJS + Express
 
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bypassing the "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" error when accessing your Node JS app locally. Just paste this code in your app.js: app.use(function(req, res, next) { res.header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', "*"); res.header('Access-Control-Allow-Methods','GET,PUT,POST,DELETE'); res.header('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type'); next(); })
Views: 49042 Clint Gh
Client-Side Security Policies for the Web - Lieven Desmet
 
01:26:39
A lecture by Lieven Desmet at SecAppDev Leuven 2013. Learning objectives + Understand the origin-based separation model in web applications. + Gain insight in upcoming web security technology, being standardized as part of the web infrastructure (HTML5 sandbox, Origin header, CORS, X-Frame-Options, CSP, ...) + Understand the benefits and drawbacks of these mechanisms for coarse-grained website confinement within the browser Overview The de facto security policy in web applications is the Same-Origin Policy (SOP). From the early start, it was meant to confine websites within their origin, while still allowing navigation between different sites. In practise however, the origin-bound security model turns out to be too permissive as well as too restrictive. In this talk, I will discuss various security mechanisms, being proposed within various web standardization activities and by browser vendors. These mechanisms allow the website owner to have more control over the confinement of third-party content within his site (e.g. the integration of third-party scripts and inner frames), and over the way his content is used by external sites. All these security mechanisms have a similar deployment pattern: security policies are defined by the website owner, and are enforced by security controls within the browser environment. Important examples of such client-side security policies are the HTML5 sandbox attribute, the Origin header and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing protocol, the X-Frame-Options header, and the Content Security Policy (CSP). Lieven Desmet is Research Manager on Secure Software within the DistriNet Research Group at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where he coaches junior researchers in web application security and participates in dissemination and valorization activities. His interests are in software verification and security of middleware and web-enabled technologies. He is on the Belgium OWASP chapter board.
Views: 939 secappdev.org
OWASP AppSec 2010: New Insights into Clickjacking 1/2
 
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Clip 1/2 Speaker: Marco Balduzzi, Eurecom Over the past year, clickjacking received extensive media coverage. News portals and security forums have been overloaded by posts claiming clickjacking to be the upcoming security threat. In a clickjacking attack, a malicious page is constructed (or a benign page is hijacked) to trick the user into performing unintended clicks that are advantageous for the attacker, such as propagating a web worm, stealing confidential information or abusing of the user session. In this talk, we formally define the problem and introduce our novel solution for automated detection of clickjacking attacks. We present the details of the system architecture and its implementation, and we evaluate the results we obtained from the analysis of over a million unique Internet pages. We conclude by discussing the clickjacking phenomenon and its future implications. For more information click here (http://bit.ly/aeSvg2)
Views: 186 Christiaan008
Recent Web Security Technology - Lieven Desmet
 
01:28:19
Recent Web Security Technology, by Lieven Desmet The de facto security policy in web applications is the Same-Origin Policy (SOP). From the early start, it was meant to confine websites within their origin, while still allowing navigation between different sites. In practice however, the origin-bound security model turns out to be too permissive as well as too restrictive. In this talk, I will discuss various security mechanisms, being proposed within various web standardization activities and by browser vendors. These mechanisms allow the website owner to have more control over the confinement of third-party content within his site (e.g. the integration of third-party scripts and inner frames), and over the way his content is used by external sites. All these security mechanisms have a similar deployment pattern: security policies are defined by the website owner, and are enforced by security controls within the browser environment. Important examples of such recent web security technology are the HTML5 sandbox attribute, the Origin header and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing protocol, the X-Frame-Options header, HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and the Content Security Policy (CSP). Learning objectives + Understand the origin-based separation model in web applications + Gain insight in upcoming web security technology, being standardized as part of the web infrastructure (HTML5 sandbox, Origin header, CORS, X-Frame-Options, CSP, HSTS, ...) + Understand the benefits and drawbacks of these mechanisms for coarse-grained website confinement within the browser This lecture was delivered by Lieven Desmet at SecAppDev 2014 in Leuven. Lieven Desmet is Research Manager on Secure Software within the iMinds-DistriNet Research Group at the KU Leuven. His interests are in software security and the security of web-enabled technologies. He is on the Belgium OWASP chapter board. As research manager, Lieven Desmet coordinates the different security research tracks within DistriNet, outlines new research programs and coaches junior researchers in (web) application security. In particular, he follows up on valorization opportunities and collaborations with industrial partners. Lieven Desmet bootstrapped the web application security research within DistriNet and has built a dedicated research team which belongs to the top in Europe. The core expertise of the team includes cross-domain interactions in web environments, HTML5 and JavaScript security and the security of web mashups. He intensively collaborates on these topics with labs and industrial partners across Europe.
Views: 1152 secappdev.org
HTTP Headers - The State of the Web
 
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Rick speaks with Andrew Betts about HTTP headers. Andrew is a Technical Product Manager and Developer Advocate at Fastly - he gives some valuable insight into the importance of metadata in HTTP headers for web performance and security. Learn all about it in this episode! W3C TAG → http://bit.ly/2Jqdh13 Fastly → http://bit.ly/2PqzIsH Clear-Site-Data → https://mzl.la/2Oclzuo HTTP/2 → http://bit.ly/2yJ1c34 Headers for Hackers presentation → http://bit.ly/2qhqnFf P3P → http://bit.ly/2DdvYVM Expires → https://mzl.la/2OX77M2 X-Frame-Options → https://mzl.la/2EPnW6M Via → https://mzl.la/2RkK76i CDN-Loop → http://bit.ly/2CP0wvU CSP → http://bit.ly/2EVpIU3 HSTS → https://mzl.la/2CQ8hBH Referrer-Policy → https://mzl.la/2SwIF23 Link rel=preload → http://bit.ly/2Pu6Bo5 Early Hints → http://bit.ly/2Qe736Y Feature-Policy → http://bit.ly/2PE5Kye Fastly header best practices blog post → http://bit.ly/2OVlgJw Fastly header anti-patterns blog post → http://bit.ly/2Q7Kkd0 Watch more State of the Web episodes here → http://bit.ly/2JhAzsh Subscribe to the Chrome Developers channel to catch a new episode of The State of the Web every other Wednesday → http://bit.ly/ChromeDevs1
Client-Side Security Policies for the Web
 
01:20:52
Learning objectives + Understand the origin-based separation model in web applications. + Gain insight in upcoming web security technology, being standardized as part of the web infrastructure (HTML5 sandbox, Origin header, CORS, X-Frame-Options, CSP, ...) + Understand the benefits and drawbacks of these mechanisms for coarse-grained website confinement within the browser Overview The de facto security policy in web applications is the Same-Origin Policy (SOP). From the early start, it was meant to confine websites within their origin, while still allowing navigation between different sites. In practise however, the origin-bound security model turns out to be too permissive as well as too restrictive. In this talk, I will discuss various security mechanisms, being proposed within various web standardization activities and by browser vendors. These mechanisms allow the website owner to have more control over the confinement of third-party content within his site (e.g. the integration of third-party scripts and inner frames), and over the way his content is used by external sites. All these security mechanisms have a similar deployment pattern: security policies are defined by the website owner, and are enforced by security controls within the browser environment. Important examples of such client-side security policies are the HTML5 sandbox attribute, the Origin header and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing protocol, the X-Frame-Options header, and the Content Security Policy (CSP). Lieven Desmet is Research Manager on Secure Software within the DistriNet Research Group at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, where he coaches junior researchers in web application security and participates in dissemination and valorization activities. His interests are in software verification and security of middleware and web-enabled technologies. He is on the Belgium OWASP chapter board.
Views: 180 Injectors
OWASP Talk on Security Headers "CSP STS PKP ETC OMG WTF BBQ"  - by  Scott Helme
 
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OWASP London Chapter Meeting 28th July 2016 There are a huge number of technologies available to help us better secure our websites, but it can be difficult to know about all of them. In this talk I'm going to show you some of the headline acts in the HTTP Response Header category and just how easy it can be to quickly and effectively boost security and offer better protection to your visitors.
Views: 699 OWASP London
ERROR : Cross-Origin Request Blocked:
 
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ERROR : Cross-Origin Request Blocked: The Same Origin Policy disallows reading the remote resource at the url. This can be fixed by moving the resource to the same domain or enabling CORS. http://php999.blogspot.in/2015/02/cross-origin-request-blocked.html
Views: 2974 HIMMAT SINGH RATHORE
ClickJacking attack demonstration on Facebook
 
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/* ** CLICKJACKING */ ClickJacking or UI Redressing is an art of taking actions without the user's knowledge, such as clicking on a button that appears to perform another function. It works in all modern browsers that support frames and css. Read more: http://goo.gl/4T4Cf
Views: 5890 TheCYBERGATES
#HITB2017AMS D2T1 - Everybody Wants SOME: Advance Same Origin Method Execution - Ben Hayak
 
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SOME – “Same Origin Method Execution” is a new technique (2 years since its first big exposure) that abuses callback endpoints in order to perform a limitless number of unintended actions on a website on behalf of users, by assembling a malicious set of timed iframes and/or windows. The attack was proven against vast platforms such as WordPress and various web applications built by Google, Paypal, Microsoft and etc. This attack is not UI related nor it is confined in terms of user interaction, browser brand, HTTP X-FRAME-OPTIONS/Other response headers or a particular webpage, in fact, when a webpage found vulnerable to “SOME”, the entire domain becomes vulnerable. During this talk I intend to show and demonstrate the cleverest SOME attacks performed against real case scenarios, in addition I will demo a XSS attacks that became possible ONLY after using the SOME technique. I am going to emphasize the advance aspects of the SOME attack including a new approach in terms of interaction, in addition I am going to clarify some queries and confusions that were raised after the exposure of SOME in relation to JSONP. This talk will show you how web pages used as callback endpoints open a backdoor, even in the most protected domains, to a very powerful attack that can cause severe damage. === Ben Hayak is an Information Security Engineer and (mostly at night) researcher. His main interests are reverse engineering, web application security and client-server security. He has quite a few years of experience with Assembler/Assembly language, debugging, and programming and has three years of data communications experience with CCNA & CCNP Route qualifications. He also has experience in surveying the penetrability of data systems and providing practical solutions for organizations. Currently, he works as a Product Security Leader at Salesforce. His expertise includes reviewing, isolating, analyzing, and reverse-engineering programs that are vulnerable or malicious code in order to determine and develop protection against the specific nature of the threat. He was also one of the Top 0xA list of security researchers on Google security list for ~2 years.
HTTP header truncation attack against Google
 
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One of the demos from the Black Hat briefing "The BEAST Wins Again: Why TLS Keeps Failing to Protect HTTP" at Black Hat 2014
Views: 1267 Inria Prosecco
04  Cross site Scripting XSS 04  Same origin Policy
 
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Same origin Policy
Views: 1819 CarAni Studio
Recent web security technologies, 2015 update - Lieven Desmet
 
01:31:05
The de facto security policy in web applications is the Same-Origin Policy (SOP). From the start, it was meant to confine websites within their origin, while still allowing navigation between different sites. In practice however, the origin-bound security model turns out to be too permissive as well as too restrictive. In this talk, I will discuss various security mechanisms, being proposed within various web standardization activities and by browser vendors. These mechanisms allow the website owner to have more control over the confinement of third-party content within his site (e.g. the integration of third-party scripts and inner frames), and over the way his content is used by external sites. All these security mechanisms have a similar deployment pattern: security policies are defined by the website owner, and are enforced by security controls within the browser environment. Important examples of such recent web security technology are the HTML5 sandbox attribute, the Origin header and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing protocol, the X-Frame-Options header, HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and the Content Security Policy (CSP). This lecture was delivered at SecAppDev 2015. Lieven Desmet is Research Manager on Secure Software within the iMinds-DistriNet Research Group at the KU Leuven. His interests are in software security and the security of web-enabled technologies. He is on the Belgium OWASP chapter board. As research manager, Lieven Desmet coordinates the different security research tracks within DistriNet, outlines new research programs and coaches junior researchers in (web) application security. In particular, he follows up on valorization opportunities and collaborations with industrial partners. Lieven Desmet bootstrapped the web application security research within DistriNet and has built a dedicated research team which belongs to the top in Europe. The core expertise of the team includes cross-domain interactions in web environments, HTML5 and JavaScript security and the security of web mashups. He intensively collaborates on these topics with labs and industrial partners across Europe.
Views: 141 secappdev.org
Understanding SOP & its Bypass
 
11:45
what is SOP, how SOP Bypass works, 2016 SOP Bypass Techniques. IE SOP Exceptions
Views: 510 Programming Wizard
Iframe Cross Domain
 
00:40
IFrame'in Cross Domain sorununu nasıl aşılabileceği aşağıdaki makalede anlatılmıştır. Blog: http://www.borakasmer.com/iframe-ile-ana-sayfa-arasinda-cross-domain-problemi-nasil-cozulur
Views: 838 bora kaşmer
Facebook FBML content extraction demo
 
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This is a demo of a (now fixed) vulnerability reported to Facebook. More info: http://blog.kotowicz.net/2012/08/how-facebook-lacked-x-frame-options-and.html
Views: 1290 koto123
IIS 7 Resolve Clickjacking
 
00:03
IIS 7 Resolve Clickjacking
Views: 528 IT Resolutions
Google Chrome Cross Origin Bypass
 
00:31
Google Chrome Cross Origin Bypass
Views: 2273 Jordi Chancel
same origin policy final
 
01:30
AJAX security
Views: 486 Archana Patel
Same-Origin Policy Bypass on file:/// URIs - Local file stealing in Firefox for Android
 
06:36
Vulnerability of Mozilla Firefox for Android (FIXED) : file: URIs SOP Bypass Local private data into the local Firefox folder can be stolen [session files stealing leading to private data theft]
Views: 283 Jordi Chancel
[웹해킹] Clickjacking으로 광고클릭 유도해서 부자되자^^
 
10:16
제목은 어그로일뿐, 고의 광고 클릭을 실제로 하지는 맙시다. Same Origin Policy : 동일 출처 정책으로 나 자신의 웹사이트 요청만 허용하는 것. 좋아요와 많은 구독 부탁드립니다 ^^ Site : http://hakhub.net Blog : http://whackur.tistory.com 모의 침투 연구회 페이스북 : https://fb.com/groups/metasploits e-mail : [email protected]
Views: 394 웨커 TV
Michael Neale - CORS: Cross-domain requests with JavaScript
 
13:20
You all know the same origin policy. And you have all probably heard about json-p. But there is a better way: CORS. With oauth, openid, and applications opening up JSON-based endpoints, your browser is the perfect place to combine data into new apps - less server side programming needed. CORS allows you to have your web apps talk directly and securely to any server, not just the origin. It is relatively simple to use, with a few tricks and gotchas. Let me show you how it works and how it can be setup (warning: some servers will be hurt).
Views: 65694 webdirections
CSRF _ Clickjacking _ Google Document, Drawing, Forms, Spreadsheet, Presentation - YouTube
 
04:35
Hacking Google users with GooPass Which is a Phishing attack

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